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Abstract
The Marinatto-Weber approach to quantum game is a straightforward way to apply the power of
quantum mechanics to classical game theory. In the simplest case, the quantum scheme is that players
manipulate their own qubits of a two-qubit state either with the identity 1 or the Pauli operator σx.
However, such a simplification of the scheme raises doubt as to whether it could really reflect a quantum
game. In this paper we put forward examples which may constitute arguments against the present form
of the Marinatto-Weber scheme. Next, we modify the scheme to eliminate the undesirable properties of
the protocol by extending the players’ strategy sets.
1 Introduction
The Marinatto-Weber (MW) scheme [1] has become one of the most frequently used schemes for quantum
games. Though it was created for research on Nash equilibria in quantum 2 × 2 games, it has also found an
application in studying some of the refinements of a Nash equilibrium, such as evolutionarily stable strate-
gies [2, 3]. Moreover, the MW scheme turns out to be applicable to finite extensive games [4]. Among other
applications, the problem of duopoly is worthy noting. It was shown in [5] that the MW scheme can be used
in Stackelberg’s model of duopoly. The paper initiated further studies on the quantum Stackelberg duopoly
[6, 7] and the quantum approach to Bertrand duopoly [8]. These recent papers show uninterrupted interest
in research on quantum games played according to the MW idea and they provide sufficient motivation to
study this protocol.
2 Preliminary to the MW approach
The MW scheme was originally designed for a 2 × 2 game
( l r
t (a00, b00) (a01, b01)
b (a10, b10) (a11, b11)
)
, where ai j ∈ R. (1)
Each of the two players acts with the identity 1 and the Pauli operator σx on his own qubit of some fixed
two-qubit state ρin = |ψin〉〈ψin|, which is called the initial state. The players’ payoffs are determined by
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measurement of the resulting final state ρfin. Formally, the final state takes the following form:
ρfin = pq1 ⊗ 1ρin1 ⊗ 1 + p(1 − q)1 ⊗ σxρin1 ⊗ σx
+ (1 − p)qσx ⊗ 1ρinσx ⊗ 1 + (1 − p)(1 − q)σx ⊗ σxρinσx ⊗ σx, (2)
where p and q are the probabilities of choosing the identity 1 by player 1 and player 2, respectively. Then
the pair of players’ payoffs (pi1, pi2) depends on p and q, and through the measurement operator
X = (a00, b00)|00〉〈00| + (a01, b01)|01〉〈01| + (a10, b10)|10〉〈10| + (a11, b11)|11〉〈11|, (3)
is given by formula
(pi1, pi2)(p, q) = tr(Xρfin). (4)
The MW protocol can also be expressed by a useful diagram
( l r
t (a00, b00) (a01, b01)
b (a10, b10) (a11, b11)
)
|ψin〉=
∑
i j λi j |i j〉−−−−−−−−−−→
( 1 σx
1 (α00, β00) (α01, β01)
σx (α10, β10) (α11, β11)
)
, (5)
where |ψin〉 =
∑
i j λi j|i j〉 is a two-qubit state and
(α00, β00) = ∑i, j |λi, j|2(ai j, bi j), (α01, β01) = ∑i, j |λi, j⊕21|2(ai j, bi j);
(α10, β10) = ∑i, j |λi⊕21, j|2(ai j, bi j), (α11, β11) = ∑i, j |λi⊕21, j⊕21|2(ai j, bi j). (6)
The bimatrix on the left of diagram (5) represents the classical (input) 2 × 2 game while the bimatrix of the
right is the output game obtained by applying the MW protocol.
Advantages of the MW approach The simplicity of the calculations and the possibility to easily extend
the scheme to consider more complex games than 2 × 2 can be counted among the advantages of the MW
scheme. The MW approach to n × m bimatrix games is defined by the initial state represented by a vector
from Cn ⊗ Cm and appropriate n and m unitary operators for player 1 and 2, respectively (see [9]). In any
such case the dimension of the output game is always equal to the input game, which does not make the
output game more difficult to deal with. In particular, determining Nash equilibria or evolutionarily stable
strategies have the same level of difficulty in both the classical and quantum games.
The MW approach has also achieved popularity because it has found application in infinite games; that
is in games where the players’ strategy sets are infinite. For example, in [5] the authors showed a way to
apply the MW approach to Stackelberg’s model of duopoly—game in which the players’ strategy sets are
identified with interval [0,∞) (to learn the model of duopoly, see the orginal paper [10] or textbook [11]).
3 Undesirable features of the MW approach
In spite of the simplicity and large number of applications, the MW scheme has been driven by more
complex schemes: the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein approach [12] in the case of quantum 2 × 2 games and
the Li et al. approach [13] in the case of various types of duopolies. Below we point out the main flaws in
the MW approach.
Problem of non-classical games induced by separable initial states The common criticism of the MW
scheme is that the initial state has an excessive impact on the output game. In other words, the initial state
plays the main role in producing the non-classical output game and the output games may vary signifi-
cantly from each other depending on the initial state. However, in our view, this is not a disadvantage of
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the scheme. Quantum information techniques like superdense coding, the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger
example, the violation of the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt inequality and many others are also based on
preparing some special quantum state and (or) operators acting on it so that non-classical results could be
obtained. But in every such protocol the quantum state has to be an entangled one. Unfortunately, the MW
scheme outputs a non-classical game even if the initial state is separable. Let us take the following example:
( l r
t (5, 3) (1, 1)
b (1, 1) (3, 5)
) |ψin〉= 1√2 (|00〉+|01〉)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
( 1 σx
1 (3, 2) (3, 2)
σx (2, 3) (2, 3)
)
. (7)
Though the outcome corresponding to any strategy profile of the output game can be obtained through
a suitable strategy profile in the input game, the output game is not equivalent to the classical one. The
outcomes greater that 3 are not available in the output game and the only reasonable result of the game is
(3, 2)—the result that is never chosen by rational players in the input game.
Insufficient range of players’ actions The two element set {1, σx} of players’ strategies seems to be
appropriate in the MW scheme. The identity 1 and the Pauli matrix σx are supposed to represent classical
moves, while the initial quantum state |ψin〉 plays the role of a joint strategy. However, such a setting can
lead to a situation in which a player has no influence on the outcome of the output game. This can be easily
observed with example (7). The second qubit is prepared in the superposition (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2. Then, no
matter what operation (any probability distribution on 1 and σx) the second player performs on his own
qubit, he cannot change the state and therefore he cannot influence the outcome of the game. In this case
the second player would need operators
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
and 1√
2
(−1 1
1 1
)
(8)
in order to obtain the states |0〉 and |1〉, respectively. Only then would the outcomes of the input game in (7)
be achievable.
In fact, any separable state other than |i j〉 can lead through the MW approach to output games which
are not equivalent to classical ones. The way to remove this property (keeping the general MW approach
unchanged) is to broaden the range of unitary operations for players. Since a qubit in a separable state takes
the effective form
cos
θ
2
|0〉 + eiϕ sin θ
2
|1〉, (9)
two-parameter unitary operators are required to obtain the states |0〉 and |1〉 from state (9). For this reason,
let us consider unitary operators
U(θ, ϕ) =
(
cos θ2 e
−iϕ sin θ2
eiϕ sin θ2 − cos θ2
)
(10)
and assume that each player i’s strategies are triples
for player 1: {(p, θ1, ϕ1) : 0 6 p 6 1, 0 6 θ1 6 pi, 0 6 ϕ1 6 2pi}, (11)
for player 2: {(q, θ2, ϕ2) : 0 6 q 6 1, 0 6 θ2 6 pi, 0 6 ϕ2 6 2pi}. (12)
Next, we define the final state
ρfin = pqU1 ⊗ U2ρinU†1 ⊗ U†2 + p(1 − q)U1 ⊗ V2ρinU†1 ⊗ V†2
+ (1 − p)qV1 ⊗ U2ρinV†1 ⊗ U†2 + (1 − p)(1 − q)V1 ⊗ V2ρinV†1 ⊗ V†2 , (13)
where
Ui := U(θi, ϕ), Vi = U(pi − θi, ϕi − pi). (14)
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Then for any separable pure state
|ψin〉 = eiδ
(
cos
θ1
2
|0〉 + eiϕ1 sin θ1
2
|1〉
)
⊗
(
cos
θ2
2
|0〉 + eiϕ2 sin θ2
2
|1〉
)
, (15)
each player i can select appropriate θi and ϕi such that the operators (14) create the final state
ρfin = pq|00〉〈00| + p(1 − q)|01〉〈01| + (1 − p)q|10〉〈10| + (1 − p)(1 − q)|11〉〈11|, (16)
which implies the input (classical) game in the MW scheme.
The extension (10)-(14) removes the players’ powerlessness against maximal superpositions. Moreover,
it guarantees that the classical game can be reconstructed in the case of separable states. The solution,
however, seems a bit artificial. One may question why the players are not allowed to use the full range
of unitary operators or why a probability distribution over the two-parameter operators is not given by a
probability density function. Moreover, the refinement (10)-(14) does not solve the following problem:
Choice of the initial state The choice of the initial state has a significant impact on the output game.
However, the MW protocol does not allow the players to take a part in choosing the initial state. It causes
many undesirable features of the scheme. In particular, there is a possibility that the output game induced
by some fixed initial state could favor one of the players and be unjust to the other one, even if the strategic
positions in the input game are completely identical. In other words, it would be the case that a player is
not satisfied by the initial state and she would be willing to change the initial state if she were allowed to.
Since the initial state is supposed to be the players’ joint strategy, the players should have some influence in
choosing the initial state, otherwise it stands in contradiction with game-theoretical sense of strategy being
an element chosen by a player.
Furthermore, the fact that the initial state is treated as the joint strategy ought to be taken into considera-
tion in game-theoretical solution concepts. For example, in a Nash equilibrium no player gains by deviating
from the equilibrium strategy. Therefore, each player should have the possibility of rejecting the initial state
|ψin〉 if the ‘classical’ state |00〉 would increase his payoff.
4 A new model based on the MW scheme
Let us modify the MW scheme to obtain a protocol which is free from the flaws listed in the previous section.
In order to do that let us redefine the final state (2) keeping the operator (3) and payoff functional (4)
unchanged. We assume now that the players are additionally allowed to choose whether they play the
classical or quantum game. That is, each player decides to choose either 1 or σx and at the same time
whether to perform the chosen local action on |00〉 or |ψin〉. Since the quantum state |ψin〉 is considered the
joint strategy, we assume that if the both players pick the action ‘quantum’, the chosen actions from the set
{1, σx} are performed on state |ψin〉, otherwise the players apply the local actions to state |00〉.
Denote by C and Q the actions ‘classical’ and ‘quantum’, respectively. In such a scheme each player has
four pure strategies which we denote by C×1,C×σx,Q×1 and Q×σx. Thus, the extended Marinatto-Weber
(eMW) scheme is formally defined as follows:
Definition 1 If |ψin〉 ∈ C2 ⊗C2 represents a pure quantum state, τ1 = (p1, p2, p3, p4) and τ2 = (q1, q2, q3, q4)
are mixed strategies over {C × 1,C × σx,Q × 1,Q × σx} of player 1 and 2, respectively, i.e. pi, qi > 0,∑
i pi = 1 and
∑
i qi = 1 and X is as in (3), then the extended final state ρext is given by
ρext = 1 ⊗ 1
((p1q1 + p1q3 + p3q1)|00〉〈00| + p3q3|ψin〉〈ψin|)1 ⊗ 1
+ 1 ⊗ σx
((p1q2 + p1q4 + p3q2)|00〉〈00| + p3q4|ψin〉〈ψin|)1 ⊗ σx
+ σx ⊗ 1
((p2q1 + p2q3 + p4q1)|00〉〈00| + p4q3|ψin〉〈ψin|)σx ⊗ 1
+ σx ⊗ σx
((p2q2 + p2q4 + p4q2)|00〉〈00| + p4q4|ψin〉〈ψin|)σx ⊗ σx (17)
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and the payoff pair is pi(τ1, τ2) = tr(Xρext).
Let us see how formula (17) works. If, for example, player 1 chooses operation 1 and the actions ‘classical’
and ‘quantum’ with equal probability (which means choosing C × 1 and Q × 1 with equal probability)
and player 2 picks Q × σx, then p1 = p3 = 1/2 and q4 = 1. It implies that formula (17) takes on ρext =(|01〉〈01| + 1 ⊗ σx|ψin〉〈ψin|1 ⊗ σx)/2.
Like in the MW scheme there exists a convenient way to express the eMW scheme using bimatrix form,
in this case by means of a 4 × 4 bimatrix game. The individual entries of the bimatrix can be obtained by
determining the payoffs pi(τ1, τ2) for each of the 16 possible pure profiles
(τ1, τ2) ∈ {{C,Q} × {1, σx}}1 × {{C,Q} × {1, σx}}2. (18)
Another way to obtain the bimatrix form is to use diagram (5). Indeed, formula (17) says that players play
the game on the right of diagram (5) if they both have chosen Q. In this case p1 = p2 = q1 = q2 = 0 and
then formula (17) coincides with the final state (2). In the other cases (i.e. given that p3q3 = p3q4 = p4q3 =
p4q4 = 0) the players play the classical game (on the left of diagram (5)) because they perform 1 and σx on
state |00〉〈00| then. We thus obtain the following bimatrix counterpart:

C × 1 C × σx Q × 1 Q × σx
C × 1 (a00, b00) (a01, b01) (a00, b00) (a01, b01)
C × σx (a10, b10) (a11, b11) (a10, b10) (a11, b11)
Q × 1 (a00, b00) (a01, b01) (α00, β00) (α01, β01)
Q × σx (a10, b10) (a11, b11) (α10, β10) (α11, β11)
, (19)
where (αi j, βi j) are as in (6). The eMW scheme generalizes the classical way of playing games. If |ψin〉 =
|00〉, the strategies from the set {C,Q} × 1 and {C,Q} × σx are equivalent to each other, i.e. they induce the
same payoff pairs for any pure strategy played by the opponent. Therefore, the quotient game obtained by
removing equivalent strategies (leaving the one representative) coincides with the original one in respect of
the game outcomes and players’ strategic positions.
In general, the eMW scheme provides output games quite different from ones induced by the MW
scheme. Since a unilateral deviation from the classical action C does not make the players play on |ψin〉, a
Nash equilibrium in an input game (1) remains the equilibrium in the quantum counterpart (19). Moreover,
in a case that the players do not find the quantum strategy mutually advantageous, the classical equilibria
are the only ones in game (19). This property is well illustrated by the following example:
Example 1 Let us consider a 2 × 2 game given by bimatrix
( l r
t (α, β) (γ, γ)
b (γ, γ) (β, α)
)
, where α, β, γ ∈ R and α > β > γ. (20)
This is the general form of a game called Battle of the Sexes (the game on the left of diagram (7) is
the particular case). The example was used in [1] to show that the players playing the quantum strategy
|ψin〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/
√
2 have access to Nash equilibria with better results than in the case of playing only
classical strategies (see also [14] and [15]). The eMW scheme shows, however, that state (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2
would never be chosen by the players. Indeed, if the players are allowed to decide whether to choose the
entangled state or not, they face the following game:

C × 1 C × σx Q × 1 Q × σx
C × 1 (α, β) (γ, γ) (α, β) (γ, γ)
C × σx (γ, γ) (β, α) (γ, γ) (β, α)
Q × 1 (α, β) (γ, γ)
(
α + β
2
,
α + β
2
)
(γ, γ)
Q × σx (γ, γ) (β, α) (γ, γ)
(
α + β
2
,
α + β
2
)

(21)
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Now, if the players were restricted to using only Q×{1, σx}, game (21) would come down to one associated
with the MW scheme and strategy profiles: (Q × 1,Q × 1), (Q × σx,Q × σx) and one in which each player
plays Q×1 and Q×σx with equal probability would constitute Nash equilibria. However, these profiles are
no longer equilibria in game (21). The first player’s best response to Q × 1 of player 2 is C × 1 instead of
Q × 1. The second pure profile is not an equilibrium for similar reasons. Next, for probability distribution
{1/2, 1/2} over Q× {1, σx} played by one of the players, the best response of the other player is C ×1. As a
result, since a Nash equilibrium is considered a necessary condition for a strategy profile to be a reasonable
one, the quantum strategy (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2 would not be chosen by the players. It does not have to indicate,
however, that the players cannot benefit from quantum strategies. Let us consider similar (in terms of the
MW scheme) state (|01〉 + |10〉)/√2. The MW approach through this state also implies two pure Nash
equilibria with outcome (α + β)/2 for each player and the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. However,
only (Q × 1,Q × σx) remains an equilibrium if the players are able to decide whether to use the quantum
state or not since they play the game given by bimatrix

C × 1 C × σx Q × 1 Q × σx
C × 1 (α, β) (γ, γ) (α, β) (γ, γ)
C × σx (γ, γ) (β, α) (γ, γ) (β, α)
Q × 1 (α, β) (γ, γ) (γ, γ)
(
α + β
2
,
α + β
2
)
Q × σx (γ, γ) (β, α)
(
α + β
2
,
α + β
2
)
(γ, γ)

. (22)
The opposite players’ preferences in the classical battle of the sexes game (player 1 prefers (C × 1,C × 1),
whereas player 2 prefers (C × σx,C × σx) if game is played classically) make (Q × 1,Q × σx) the most
reasonable profile.
5 The disadvantages of the MW approach versus the eMW scheme
Since a quantum state |ψin〉 is considered to be a players’ joint strategy, the two additional actions: C (classi-
cal) and Q (quantum) appear to be a natural extension of the MW scheme. It turns out that this extension is
sufficient to remove the disadvantages we listed in section 3. The problem of the powerlessness of players’
actions (when the qubits are the maximal superpositions) is not a concern in the extended scheme. The
action C played by just one of the players turns the game into a classical one. For the same reason, each
outcome of the classical game is still available in the quantum counterpart (19). The extended scheme also
removes, in some sense, the problem concerning the choice of the initial state since the players can decide
whether to play the quantum state or not. The fact that the initial state has to be chosen by an arbiter before-
hand just means that there are infinitely many possible quantum extensions of some classical game. Every
such an extension is associated with some initial quantum state then.
Division of games into classical and quantum ones It has been proved that classical correlations can
always be associated with separable states [16] and any pure entangled state violates some Bell inequality
[17, 18]. So, an interesting problem is to examine if the eMW scheme could give us a similar hierarchical
structure in quantum game theory.
First, let us assign to mixed state (17) a set of pure quantum states by means of the following simple
fact:
Fact 1 Let X be as in (3). For any density operator ρ on C2 ⊗C2 there exists a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ C2 ⊗C2 and
a mixed state ∑i j=0,1 λi j|i j〉〈i j| such that
tr(Xρ) = tr(X|ψ〉〈ψ|) = tr
X
∑
i j=0,1
λi j|i j〉〈i j|
 . (23)
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Proof Let ρ = ∑i, j,k,l=0,1 Oi jkl|i j〉〈kl| be a density operator. Putting state |ψ〉 = ∑i, j=0,1 √Oi ji j|i j〉 and numbers
λi j = Oi ji j we obtain equality (23). 
Thus, we can always relate the final state ρext to an equivalent pure state (with respect to the measurement X).
Such an assignment is necessary because specification of the MW scheme allows players to obtain strictly
non-classical results with separable mixed states. For instance, separable state ρext = (|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|)/2
given by taking p3 = 1, q1 = q3 = 1/2 and |ψin〉 = |11〉 in (17) induces tr(Xρext) = ((a00, b00)+(a11, b11))/2—
the outcome that is not available with the use of classical mixed strategies. However, if we restrict ourselves
to pure states, only entangled pure state (|00〉+ eiϕ|11〉)/√2 (up to the phase factor) generates that outcome.
Note that the state |ψin〉 is just a part of ρext. Thus, it does not have to be entangled so that the final state
generates a non-classical game.
Example 2 Let us consider the following bimatrix game:
( l r
t (5, 5) (0, 4)
b (4, 0) (2, 2)
)
. (24)
The game exhibits a conflict between two reasonable types of equilibria. The profile (b, r) is a risk dominant
equilibrium [19] (see also [15]). If one of the players is uncertain about the move of the other one, a risk
dominant strategy turns out to be a reasonable choice. On the other hand, the profile (t, l) is a payoff
dominant equilibrium for which both players receive much more.
The uncertainty about the result of game (24) disappears in the quantum domain. The final state ρext for
|ψin〉 = |11〉 implies bimatrix

C × 1 C × σx Q × 1 Q × σx
C × 1 (5, 5) (0, 4) (5, 5) (0, 4)
C × σx (4, 0) (2, 2) (4, 0) (2, 2)
Q × 1 (5, 5) (0, 4) (2, 2) (4, 0)
Q × σx (4, 0) (2, 2) (0, 4) (5, 5)
 (25)
The profile (Q × 1,Q × 1) corresponding to the risk-dominant outcome is no longer equilibrium in (25). If
the players decide to play quantum strategies, the equilibrium (Q × σx,Q × σx) that provides the players
with the payoff dominant outcome is the unique reasonable profile.
We hypothesize that the association with a pure separable state is a sufficient condition on ρext for a game
to be classical. It is not work in the case of the original MW scheme. In fact, if |ψin〉 is separable, we
can always find a separable pure state that is equivalent to (2) (with regard to measurement (3)) but, as
diagram (7) shows, the output game does not coincide with the classical one. In the eMW scheme the
players have a greater impact on the final state ρext despite the same local operators 1 and σx. It follows
from the fact that the players do not perform 1 ⊗ 1, 1 ⊗ σx, σx ⊗ 1 and σx ⊗ σx on the whole quantum
state but on the appropriate parts of it. This distinction is relevant as it allows us to formulate the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 A quotient game of a game specified by definition 1 coincides with the input game (1) if and
only if for any players’ strategies τ1 and τ2, the final state (17) satisfies equation (23) for some separable
pure state |ψ〉 ∈ C2 ⊗ C2.
Proof Let us first assume that the quotient game is equal to the input game (1). In this case the pairs of
strategies C × 1,Q × 1 and C × σx,Q × σx have to be equivalent to each other which imposes |ψin〉 = |00〉
(up to the phase factor) on the final state (17) and therefore
ρext =
((p1 + p3)|0〉〈0| + (p2 + p4)|1〉〈1|) ⊗ ((q1 + q3)|0〉〈0| + (q2 + q4)|1〉〈1|). (26)
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Then for any pi, qi, a separable state
|ψ〉 = (√p1 + p3|0〉 + √p2 + p4|1〉) ⊗ (√q1 + q3|0〉 + √q2 + q4|1〉) (27)
satisfies the equation tr(Xρfin) = tr(X|ψ〉〈ψ|).
On the other hand, let us determine the general form of the final state ρext. The equation (23) shows
that we can replace |ψin〉〈ψin| with some mixed state
∑
i, j=0,1 ηi j|i j〉〈i j| without loss of generality. Thus the
general final state can be written as follows:
ρext = (p1q1 + p1q3 + p3q1 + p3q3η00 + p3q4η01 + p4q3η10 + p4q4η11)|00〉〈00|
+ (p1q2 + p1q4 + p3q2 + p3q3η01 + p3q4η00 + p4q3η11 + p4q4η10)|01〉〈01|
+ (p2q1 + p2q3 + p4q1 + p3q3η10 + p3q4η11 + p4q3η00 + p4q4η01)|10〉〈10|
+ (p2q2 + p2q4 + p4q2 + p3q3η11 + p3q4η10 + p4q3η01 + p4q4η00)|11〉〈11|. (28)
Now, note that if |ψ〉 is separable, the third term in the equation (23) satisfies a separability condition
λ00λ11 = λ01λ10. Since for any pi, qi, state (28) is associated with some separable state, the separability
condition gives equations

(2 + η10)η01 = (1 + η00)η11 for p1 = p4 = q1 = q3 = 12 ;
(2 + η01)η10 = (1 + η00)η11 for p1 = p3 = q1 = q4 = 12 ;
(3 + η00)η11 = η01η10 for p1 = p3 = q1 = q3 = 12 .
(29)
Together with the normalization condition ∑i, j ηi, j = 1, equations (29) imply η00 = 1. As a result, state (28)
determines a game which corresponds to the input one (up to a quotient game). 
Proposition 1 tells us that |ψin〉 , |00〉 in (17) provides the players with nonclassical strategies and, as
examples 1 and 2 show, may significantly influence the game result. The non-classical result can be obtained
only if the final state relates to some entangled pure state. Thus, like in the case of theory of quantum
correlation, there exists a hierarchical structure for quantum games in regard to separable and entangled
states.
6 Further generalization of the scheme
More quantum strategies The eMW approach can be generalized to allow for more than one joint strat-
egy |ψin〉. Denote by |ψ1〉, . . . , |ψn〉 ∈ C2 ⊗ C2 the n available joint quantum strategies and by Q1, . . . ,Qn
the corresponding ‘quantum’ actions. Then, together with the local actions 1 and σx, each player has the
2(n + 1)-element set of strategies {C,Q1, . . . ,Qn} × {1, σx}. Similarly to (19), we assume that the quantum
strategy |ψi〉 is played only if both players choose Qi. Otherwise, the players perform the local operations
on |00〉〈00|. As a result, the output game can be characterized by matrix

C × {1, σx} Q1 × {1, σx} · · · Qn × {1, σx}
C × {1, σx} |00〉〈00| |00〉〈00| · · · |00〉〈00|
Q1 × {1, σx} |00〉〈00| |ψ1〉〈ψ1| · · · |00〉〈00|
...
...
...
. . .
...
Qn × {1, σx} |00〉〈00| |00〉〈00| · · · |ψn〉〈ψn|

. (30)
Formally, the construction of the appropriate final state is as follows. Denote by (p1, p2, . . . , p2(n+1)) and
(q1, q2, . . . , q2(n+1)) the mixed strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively. Probabilities p1 and p2 (q1 and q2)
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are associated with actions C × 1 and C × σx, the pair p2i+1, p2i+2 (the pair q2i+1, q2i+2) concerns Qi × 1 and
Qi × σx for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. For each i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, we define a density operator ρi j,
ρi j = p2i+1q2 j+11 ⊗ 1|φi j〉〈φi j|1 ⊗ 1 + p2i+1q2 j+21 ⊗ σx|φi j〉〈φi j|1 ⊗ σx
+ p2i+2q2 j+1σx ⊗ 1|φi j〉〈φi j|σx ⊗ 1 + p2i+2q2 j+2σx ⊗ σx|φi j〉〈φi j|σx ⊗ σx, (31)
where
|φi j〉 =
{ |ψi〉 if i = j , 0;
|00〉 if otherwise. (32)
Then the general final state corresponding to (30) is ρext = ∑ni, j=0 ρi j.
More local strategies We showed in [9] how to construct the scheme for n×m bimatrix games according
to the MW approach. In this case, player 1 (player 2) has n operators Ui (m operators V j) defined on Cn
(Cm) that act on basis states {|0〉, |1〉, . . . , |n − 1〉} ({|0〉, |1〉, . . . , |m − 1〉}) as follows:
U0|i〉 = |i〉 V0|i〉 = |i〉,
U1|i〉 = |i + 1 mod n〉 V1|i〉 = |i + 1 mod m〉,
...
Un−1|i〉 = |i + (n − 1) mod n〉 Vm−1|i〉 = |i + (l − 1) mod m〉.
(33)
The construction of the final state ρext is analogous to definition 1 but the set of pure strategies for player 1
and 2 is now {C,Q} × {U0, . . . ,Un−1} and {C,Q} × {V0, . . . ,Vm−1}, respectively.
7 Conclusions
During the last fourteen years of research into quantum games, the MW [1] and EWL [12] concepts have
become the most commonly used quantum schemes for 2 × 2 games. However, the undesirable features
of the MW scheme question if it may reflect a real quantum game. Our protocol is closer to the EWL
concept. In both the EWL and eMW scheme there is the need for entangled states to generate nonclassical
results. Next, turning the quantum game into classical one can be obtained just by the restriction of players
strategies. It is also possible to study the case where only one of the players has access to the quantum
strategy (in the EWL it is performed by the appropriate restriction of the player’s strategy set). It could be
done by allowing only one of players to decide whether to play the state |00〉 of |ψin〉, i.e., only one of the
players has access to the actions C and Q.
At the same time, the eMW scheme is much simpler that the EWL scheme for studying high-dimensional
bimatrix games. Thus, it may constitute an alternative to the EWL scheme.
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